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Abstract 
∎ In the context of a European security order under pressure, the OSCE – 
and its long neglected economic and environmental dimension – has 
developed a new dynamism. 
∎ The potential for generating trust in this area is attributed to the idea that 
economics and the environment are supposedly less sensitive issues to 
cooperate on. The assumption is that this trust can subsequently have a 
positive effect on cooperation in other fields, and contribute to greater 
security in Europe as a whole. 
∎ In this regard, the results of this study suggest that we should manage 
expectations pragmatically: the chances of cooperation on OSCE “second-
dimension” issues should be kept in perspective. 
∎ A greater degree of intergovernmental cooperation does not automatically 
mean an increase in trust, nor does spillover between “low politics” and 
“high politics” necessarily occur. 
∎ Alongside its EU partners, Germany should therefore pay particular 
attention as to how to upgrade the OSCE’s economic and environmental 
dimension. 
∎ Connections between the OSCE dimensions should be actively promoted; 
debates in the “second dimension” could be even more closely tied to the 
discussion on the crumbling basic consensus over rule-based order and 
common principles. 
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Issues and Recommendations 
Cooperation, Trust, Security? 
The Potential and Limits of the OSCE’s 
Economic and Environmental Dimension 
Following the Cold War, the Organisation for Security 
and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) led rather a niche 
existence in the shadow of NATO and the European 
Union (EU). However, starting in 2014 the OSCE has 
attracted growing attention linked to the crisis in and 
around Ukraine. Against the backdrop of tensions 
between Russia on the one hand and the EU and USA 
on the other, the Organisation with its inclusive and 
consensus-based model has now returned to the fore. 
The OSCE, which has 57 participating states and sees 
itself as a platform for dialogue in the space between 
Vancouver and Vladivostok, is regarded by many as 
one of the few remaining multilateral communica-
tion forums between “East” and “West”, and thus as 
a forum that should be further utilised. 
In particular, the Organisation’s long-neglected 
“second dimension”, which deals with economic and 
environmental issues, has been revitalised in recent 
years. Various governments consider the forum that 
the Organisation (with its headquarters in Vienna) 
offers for these policy fields as a platform for mutu-
ally beneficial cooperation with a de-escalating effect. 
A common agenda on economic and environmental 
issues, they argue, could help to restore lost trust be-
tween states. To this end, participants in the econom-
ic and environmental dimension explore such novel 
issues as “economic connectivity” or, more recently, 
“digitisation”. According to the calculations of some 
Western states, cooperation on such (supposedly) less 
intrusive matters could serve as an entry point and 
subsequently also have a positive impact on dialogue 
in the other dimensions: the first dimension dealing 
with political-military security and the third, human 
dimension of security. In these two areas there has 
recently been little consensus and therefore little 
progress. The agenda of the German OSCE chairman-
ship in 2016 was based on such an interpretation: 
Under the guiding principle “Renewing dialogue, re-
building trust, restoring security”, Germany attempted 
to enhance the second dimension by focusing on 
“connectivity”. The second dimension also attracted 
attention under the subsequent Austrian (2017) and 
Italian (2018) chairmanships, and Slovakia, which 
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holds the chair in 2019, has been continuing this 
course by focusing on “digitisation”, “connectivity” 
and “energy”. 
Given the increased engagement in the previously 
rather neglected second dimension, and against the 
background of the accompanying expectations, a 
number of questions arise. What place should the 
economic and environmental dimension actually 
have in the overall OSCE structure? What potential 
does cooperation in this dimension have for sustain-
ably generating trust? What conditions, if any, may 
need to be met for this trust to grow and for positive 
spillover to occur for dialogue within the OSCE as a 
whole? These questions, which also concern the 
(charged) relationship between the two titular corner-
stones of the OSCE, “security” and “cooperation”, will 
be examined in this study. 
The study focuses on a specific area of activity of a 
specific international organisation: the economic and 
environmental dimension of the OSCE. However, the 
insights it provides have wider applications. Given 
the crumbling European security order, commenta-
tors have repeatedly stressed the possibility of gener-
ating trust through cooperation on less controversial 
issues, thus ultimately contributing to a higher de-
gree of security and stability in Europe. In this regard, 
the results of the present study suggest a pragmatic 
managing of expectations. The academic debate 
reveals that a higher degree of intergovernmental 
cooperation does not automatically mean more trust 
between the actors involved. Moreover, positive spill-
over from negotiations on (supposedly) less entrenched 
or contentious issues to more conflict-laden ones – 
or from “low” to “high politics” – is by no means 
guaranteed. 
Adopting this sober view does not mean that re-
viving the OSCE’s economic and environmental 
dimension is redundant. Yet it should be part of 
reasonable expectations to focus particularly on how 
to upgrade the second dimension. The study offers 
some suggestions for this. Since positive spillover 
hardly occurs by itself, Germany and other EU mem-
bers could actively promote the linking of the eco-
nomic and environmental dimension with the two 
other dimensions – for example, by continuing and 
intensifying their current efforts to enshrine human 
rights references in the documents of the second 
dimension as well, and to assemble package solu-
tions, i.e. to work towards a joint vote on decisions 
from different dimensions. As well as the rounds of 
negotiations on decisions to be put to the vote at the 
Ministerial Council at the end of each OSCE year, the 
meetings of the economic and environmental dimen-
sion, which take place throughout the year, could 
also be increasingly used for exchanges on the nexus 
of the economy, the environment and security. 
Sustainable trust grows slowly and can be achieved 
through specific measures only to a limited extent, if 
at all. Nevertheless, trust is ultimately based on com-
municative practice. Germany and the EU states could 
therefore make intensive use of the meetings to pro-
mote their own positions and communicate their own 
values, even though they are not necessarily shared or 
adopted by all other participating states. A (renewed) 
focus on a clear security reference in the second 
dimension may imply that, here too, the debates 
will be more controversial than before. As long as the 
conflicting interests that certainly exist on economic 
and environmental issues as well can be discussed 
dispassionately and, at best, productively, this should 
not be seen as a disadvantage. 
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Following the end of the Cold War, the Organisation 
for Security and Cooperation in Europe long played a 
subordinate, if not marginalised, role in the institu-
tional structure of European security.1 After the col-
lapse of the Soviet Union, the CSCE/OSCE2 certainly 
had a place in the concept of a European security 
architecture consisting of several interlocking institu-
tions. However, compared to the EU and NATO, both 
of which enlarged eastwards (in 2004 and 2007, and 
in 1999 and 2004, respectively), its role became in-
creasingly diminished. As a result, the organisation 
was often associated more with niche functions or – 
at least from a traditional security perspective – with 
“soft” aspects of security such as election observation, 
preventative diplomacy, or the protection of minori-
ties.3 Since at least the late 1990s, OSCE observers 
have attested to an institutional crisis; in the mid-
2000s it culminated in some considering possibly 
winding down the organisation completely.4 
 
1 Karl-Heinz Kamp, “The Power of Institutions: NATO, the 
EU, and the OSCE”, in International Security in the 21
st
 Century. 
Germany’s International Responsibility, ed. James Bindenagel, 
Matthias Herdegen and Karl Kaiser (Bonn, 2017), 77–82 (81). 
2 In 1995 the OSCE evolved from the “Conference on Secu-
rity and Cooperation in Europe” (CSCE). 
3 William H. Hill, No Place for Russia. European Security 
Institutions since 1989 (New York, 2018), 258 (203f.); Eric Jay 
Mlyn, “OSCE: Now More Than Ever”, Cambridge Review of 
International Affairs 11, no. 2 (Spring 1998): 227–37 (228). In 
addition to the EU, NATO and the OSCE, the Council of 
Europe is also occasionally counted among these interlock-
ing institutions in the literature. 
4 Wolfgang Zellner, Identifying the Cutting Edge: The Future 
Impact of the OSCE, CORE Working Paper 17/2007 (Hamburg: 
Institute for Peace Research and Security Policy at the Uni-
versity of Hamburg [IFSH], Centre for OSCE Research [CORE], 
2007). 
The OSCE in the Shadow of NATO 
and the EU 
In fact, NATO and the EU expanded not only their 
membership, but also their fields of activity and tasks. 
After the end of the Cold War, NATO no longer saw 
itself merely as a defence alliance limited to the pro-
tection of its own territory. Instead, it added out-of-
area missions to its portfolio and, although military 
strength and deterrence remained core elements, it 
assumed additional tasks in the field of (civilian) crisis 
intervention. The EU as well developed instruments 
for crisis management – as a supplement to its eco-
nomic weight and financial resources, which it used 
in its foreign and security policy in the form of ap-
propriate incentives and the prospect of sharing in 
economic prosperity. Furthermore, the EU strength-
ened its capacity in conflict prevention and post-con-
flict rehabilitation.5 
The OSCE, with its inclusivity from the outset and 
its large geographical range from “Vancouver to Vladi-
vostok”, would have been an obvious candidate for a 
central security organisation in Europe. Moscow, in 
particular, had such a status in mind for the OSCE in 
the 1990s and pushed ahead with corresponding re-
form proposals.6 However, the OSCE was unable to 
keep pace with developments in NATO and the EU 
post-Cold War. From the point of view of many West-
ern actors, the portfolio extension carried out by 
these two organisations increasingly pushed the OSCE 
into the background. Even though both NATO (e.g. 
via the NATO-Russia Council) and the EU (e.g. within 
the framework of the Partnership and Cooperation 
Agreement) made offers of cooperation and engage-
ment to the Kremlin, Russia considered itself excluded 
 
5 Niels van Willigen and Joachim A. Koops, “The EU’s 
Relationship with NATO and OSCE”, in The SAGE Handbook of 
European Foreign Policy, ed. Knud Erik Jürgensen et al., vol. 2 
(London, 2015), 734–46 (740). 
6 Derek Averre, “The Ukraine Conflict: Russia’s Challenge 
to European Security Governance”, Europe-Asia Studies 68, 
no. 4 (June 2016): 699–725 (703–4). 
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from the two most important organisations of Euro-
pean security, and thus marginalised in important 
decisions in this policy field. Unlike in the OSCE, it 
had no voting or veto rights in either the EU or 
NATO.7 The OSCE – which unlike NATO has no 
military capacities of its own, and unlike the EU no 
significant financial resources either – essentially 
had to modestly position itself within this institu-
tional trio as a forum for dialogue that concentrates 
on “low-intensity” security aspects, and whose com-
parative strength in the political-military sphere lies 
in confidence-building measures.8 
The Russian proposals in the 1990s that aimed at 
reforming and upgrading the OSCE had met with a 
limited response on the part of the EU and the USA. 
By the mid-2000s the organisation was viewed in-
creasingly critically in Moscow.9 In particular, Russia 
and several other post-Soviet states criticised what 
they saw as the Organisation’s one-sided focus on 
human dimension issues, to the detriment of coop-
eration in political-military affairs and economic and 
environmental issues. In fact, the balance between 
dimensions had increasingly become a bone of con-
tention between participating states.10 Russia and 
 
7 Maria Raquel Freire, “Ukraine and the Restructuring of 
East-West Relations”, in The Russian Challenge to the European 
Security Environment, ed. Roger E. Kanet (Cham, 2017), 189–
209; Averre, “The Ukraine Conflict” (see note 6). 
8 Michael W. Mosser, “The EU and the OSCE: Partners or 
Rivals in the European Security Architecture?”, Paper pre-
sented at the European Union Studies Association (EUSA) Confer-
ence, Boston, 5–8 March 2015; Roberto Dominguez, “Intro-
duction: The OSCE as a Security Provider”, in The OSCE: Soft 
Security for a Hard World. Competing Theories for Understanding 
the OSCE, ed. Roberto Dominguez (Berlin et al., 2014), 17–27. 
9 Wolfgang Zellner, “Russia and the OSCE: From High 
Hopes to Disillusionment”, Cambridge Review of International 
Affairs 18, no. 3 (2005): 389–402; Viatcheslav Morozov, “Rus-
sia’s Changing Attitude toward the OSCE: Contradictions and 
Continuity”, Sicherheit und Frieden 23, no. 2 (2005): 69–73; 
Victor-Yves Ghebali, “Growing Pains at the OSCE: The Rise 
and Fall of Russia’s Pan-European Expectations”, Cambridge 
Review of International Affairs 18, no. 3 (2005): 375–88. 
10 These different prioritisations are also reflected in the 
difficult budget negotiations. While the EU is warning that 
the human dimension institutions in particular are not 
adequately financed, Russia sees a problematic imbalance 
above all in the OSCE’s supposed preference for the third 
dimension, see, e.g., OSCE, Permanent Council, Decision No. 
1288. Approval of the 2018 Unified Budget, PC.DEC/1288, 15 
February 2018, https://www.osce.org/permanent-
council/373016?download=true (accessed 23 April 2019). 
other countries have accused the Organisation of bias 
and “double standards” towards the states “east of 
Vienna”. Not least due to the numerical dominance of 
EU and NATO states, the OSCE was accused of criticis-
ing developments on the territory of the former Soviet 
Union in particular, and of interfering in the internal 
affairs of these countries.11 The different perspectives 
on European security issues increasingly influenced 
and paralysed decision-making within the Organisa-
tion.12 
The crisis that began in 2014 in and 
around Ukraine marked a turning 
point in the perception of the OSCE. 
Back from the Sidelines? 
The crisis that began in 2014 in and around Ukraine 
marked a turning point in the perception of the OSCE. 
The Organisation accrued importance; according to 
Frank-Walter Steinmeier, acting German president 
and former foreign minister, it is once again “indis-
pensable” today.13 Various actors had previously criti-
 
Since the OSCE does not have the legal status of an inter-
national organisation, the states represented in it are not 
referred to as “member states”, but as “participating states”. 
11 Richard Sakwa, Russia against the Rest. The Post-Cold War 
Crisis of World Order, Cambridge 2017, 141; Frank Evers, In 
Retrospect: Points for Dialogue with Russia in the OSCE Context. 
Conclusions from Russian Scientific Periodicals 2010–2015, CORE 
Working Paper 31/2018 (Hamburg: CORE, May 2018), 6. 
12 Hill, No Place for Russia (see note 3), 322; Geneva Centre 
for the Democratic Control of the Armed Forces (DCAF)/ 
Centre for Security Studies (CSS), Empowering the OSCE in 
Challenging Times: Reflections and Recommendations. Conference 
Report (Geneva, 2017), 
https://www.dcaf.ch/sites/default/files/publications/documents
/OSCE_Focus_2017_Report.pdf (accessed 16 April 2019). 
13 Frank-Walter Steinmeier, “Foreword by the Chairperson-
in-Office”, in OSCE Yearbook 2016, ed. IFSH (Baden-Baden, 
2018), 9–11 (9); see also Hill, No Place for Russia (see note 3); 
Stefan Lehne, Reviving the OSCE: European Security and the 
Ukraine Crisis (Brussels: Carnegie Europe, 22 September 2015), 
https://carnegieeurope.eu/2015/09/22/reviving-osce-european-
security-and-ukraine-crisis-pub-61362; OSCE Network of 
Think Tanks and Academic Institution to the Panel of Emi-
nent Persons, Reviving Co-operative Security in Europe through the 
OSCE (2015), 13, http://osce-network.net/file-OSCE-Network/ 
documents/Reviving_Co-operative_Security_in_Europe_ 
through_the_OSCE_web.pdf (both accessed 20 August 2019); 
Jan Asmussen, “Die Ukraine-Krise – Hybride Kriegsführung 
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cised the forum for dialogue and negotiation as an 
inefficient “talking shop”.14 Since then, the Organisa-
tion has been recognised as one of the few remaining 
platforms for communication between East and West. 
Suddenly, those OSCE characteristics that were pre-
viously held against it for limiting the Organisation’s 
room for manoeuvre, such as its strong consensus 
orientation, were seen as advantages. In the OSCE, 
the consensus rule is deviated from only in the case 
of extremely flagrant violations of the institution’s 
principles (“consensus minus one”), which de facto 
grants the states represented in the OSCE a veto op-
tion. Instead of sanctions to enforce norms, the OSCE 
relies on norm socialisation. The decisions it takes are 
not legally binding. 
According to its supporters, the OSCE 
could contribute to restoring lost 
trust in Europe. 
In view of current challenges to European security, 
policy-oriented observers see a particular advantage 
in the OSCE’s niche position and function in the 
shadow of NATO and the EU, and in its specific in-
clusive formats and decision-making processes. For 
them, the OSCE is predestined to be a place of dia-
logue between all relevant actors since it is a non-
partisan, neutral forum, in which all represented 
states have equal voting rights and thus act on an 
equal footing, officially at least.15 According to its 
supporters, the Organisation could thus contribute 
to restoring lost trust in Europe.16 
 
und die Wiedergeburt der OSZE”, in Globale Sicherheit und die 
Zukunft politischer Ordnungen, ed. Andrea Gawrich and Wil-
helm Knelangen (Opladen et al., 2017), 163–82. 
14 P. Terrence Hopmann, “The Future Impact of the OSCE: 
Business as Usual or Revitalization?”, in OSCE Yearbook 2008, 
ed. IFSH (Baden-Baden, 2009), 75–90 (88), https://ifsh.de/file-
CORE/documents/yearbook/english/08/Hopmann-en.pdf 
(accessed 16 April 2019). 
15 De facto, the OSCE’s participating states have different 
weight within it, see Vincent Pouliot, “Hierarchy in Practice: 
Multilateral Diplomacy and the Governance of International 
Security”, European Journal of International Security 1, no. 1 
(2016): 5–26. 
16 See e.g. the position paper by the SPD Parliamentary 
Group in the Bundestag, Dialog – Vertrauen – Sicherheit. 
Voraussetzungen und Impulse für eine zeitgemäße sozialdemokrati-
sche Entspannungspolitik (Berlin, October 2018), 
https://www.spdfraktion.de/system/files/documents/positionsp
However, the attitudes of the OSCE’s participating 
states continue to diverge with regard to which tasks 
it should actually tackle.17 The divergence of opinion 
is particularly marked concerning what degree of 
importance human dimension issues should have in 
the OSCE’s work, in particular deploying election 
observation missions, monitoring the freedom of the 
press and media, and ensuring respect for human 
rights. Consensus has therefore been the exception 
rather than the rule in the third dimension for sev-
eral years. The relevance of the first dimension, 
which covers political-military aspects of security, was 
underscored by the crisis in and around Ukraine. The 
OSCE’s Special Monitoring Mission which is deployed 
there is now regarded as a flagship of the entire Orga-
nisation. But here, too, we can see how deep the 
divisions currently are. In the context of conflicting 
Russian, European and American views on the threats 
to European security and their causes, existing agree-
ments such as the Vienna Document on Confidence- 
and Security-Building Measures are still waiting for 
updates. The current setbacks in international arms 
control give little cause for confidence that there will 
be progress in this area within the OSCE in the fore-
seeable future.18 The Structured Dialogue, a relatively 
new format for exchanges in the political-military 
field, was decided at the OSCE Ministerial Council in 
Hamburg in 2016. While its establishment was linked 
to hopes for rapprochement between Russia and the 
Western states, it has also recently lost momentum, 
at least according to some close observers.19 
 
apier-spdfraktion-dialog-vertrauen-sicherheit-20181009.pdf 
(accessed 16 September 2019). 
17 Andrei Zagorski, Strengthening the OSCE. Building a Common 
Space for Economic and Humanitarian Cooperation, an Indivisible 
Security Community from the Atlantic to the Pacific (Moscow, 
2014), 15. 
18 Wolfgang Richter, Erneuerung der konventionellen Rüstungs-
kontrolle in Europa. Vom Gleichgewicht der Blöcke zur regionalen 
Stabilität in der Krise, SWP Study 17/2019 (Berlin: Stiftung 
Wissenschaft und Politik, July 2019); on the Vienna Docu-
ment see pp. 21–25. 
19 Christian Nünlist, The OSCE’s Military Pillar: The Swiss FSC 
Chairmanship, CSS Analyses in Security Policy 237/2018 
(Zurich: Center for Security Studies at ETH Zurich [CSS], 
December 2018), https://ethz.ch/content/dam/ethz/special-
interest/gess/cis/center-for-securities-
studies/pdfs/CSSAnalyse237-EN.pdf; idem, “Under Pressure: 
The Uncertain Future of the OSCE Structured Dialogue”, 
Security and Human Rights Monitor (online), 29 November 2018 
https://www.shrmonitor.org/under-pressure-the-uncertain-
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In view of this, the OSCE’s long neglected second 
dimension has garnered attention. The OSCE Panel of 
Eminent Persons even reports that “in a radical re-
verse of the past 30 years, the economic and environ-
mental dimension is no longer the ‘empty basket’ 
and, at the moment, is one of the few entry points for 
dialogue between Europe and Russia”.20 Those in 
favour of intensifying cooperation in this dimension 
believe that the exchange on (supposedly) less contro-
versial economic and environmental issues is an 
opportunity to resume a more constructive dialogue 
between Vancouver and Vladivostok. The trust re-
gained within this framework could ultimately, 
according to these calculations, provide a foundation 
for positive dynamics in other areas with which the 
Organisation is concerned.21 
 
future-of-the-osce-structured-dialogue/ (both accessed 20 
August 2019). 
20 Renewing Dialogue on European Security: A Way Forward. 
Report on Outreach Events of the Panel of Eminent Persons on Euro-
pean Security as a Common Project in 2016 (23 November 2016), 
9, https://www.osce.org/networks/291001?download=true 
(accessed 16 April 2019). 
21 This study focuses on the interaction of participating 
states and Vienna-based delegations in the economic and 
environmental dimension. Its findings are based on various 
OSCE documents, secondary literature and informal back-
ground discussions. Further insights were provided by the 
author’s stay of several months at the German representa-
tion to the OSCE in Vienna, with a focus on the economic 
and environmental dimension. The work of the field mis-
sions and the Office of the Co-ordinator of OSCE Economic 
and Environmental Activities in the OSCE Secretariat is not 
dealt with here, taking into account the background of the 
strongly intergovernmental character of the Organisation. 
On OSCE intergovernmentality see, Michael W. Bauer and 
Jörn Ege, “Bureaucratic Autonomy of International Organi-
zations’ Secretariats”, Journal of European Public Policy 23, no. 7 
(April 2016): 1019–37; Kurt P. Tudyka, “The Margin beyond 
Intergovernmentalism. The Organization for Security and 
Cooperation in Europe”, in Autonomous Policy Making by Inter-
national Organizations, ed. Bob Reinalda and Bertjan Verbeek 
(London and New York, 2003), 108–19. 
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Those forces wanting to revive the second dimension, 
expecting positive impulses for the Organisation as a 
whole and for European security, start with two close-
ly connected guiding principles of the OSCE: the crea-
tion of cooperative security and of comprehensive 
security. Both concepts have shaped the CSCE since its 
inception in the 1970s. 
Comprehensive Security 
In its founding phase, the CSCE was ahead of other 
international actors, who had a narrower security 
understanding; even then it did not limit “security” to 
political-military issues. Instead, the state conference 
also subsumed cooperation in the fields of economics, 
the environment and science under the term security, 
as well as social, humanitarian, cultural and partici-
patory aspects. Organisationally, this concept of com-
prehensive security was expressed in the structure of 
conference work in the so-called “three baskets”, later 
renamed “three dimensions”: the first, political-mili-
tary dimension; the second, dealing with economic 
and environmental issues; and the third, the human 
dimension. On the one hand, the concept of compre-
hensive security took account of the fact that security 
is multi-layered and complex and therefore cannot be 
reduced to political-military aspects. On the other, it 
was also an expression of the different interests of the 
participating states from the very beginning of the 
CSCE process, allowing these different priorities to be 
balanced by serving all three baskets.22 
 
22 Vojtech Mastny, The Helsinki Process and Reintegration of 
Europe 1986–1991. Analysis and Documentation (New York, 
1992), 4, 15. 
Cooperative Security 
Along with a comprehensive understanding of secu-
rity, the CSCE/OSCE also represented the concept of 
“cooperative security”: “Security is indivisible and the 
security of every participating State is inseparably 
linked to that of all others”; it cannot be achieved at 
the cost of other participating states.23 From this per-
spective, the lack of security of one state has a nega-
tive impact on all others.24 Cooperative security thus 
ideally excludes the use of physical force or its threat 
among the participating states of the CSCE/OSCE. The 
“Decalogue” of the Helsinki Final Act, on which the 
participating states agreed in 1975, already under-
lined this: among its fundamental principles were 
peaceful settlement of disputes, non-use and non-
threat of force, and cooperation among states.25 With 
the concept of cooperative security, the CSCE/OSCE 
thus also transcended the prevailing understanding of 
security by replacing confrontational strategies based 
on coercion or military deterrence with cooperative 
approaches. The latter can essentially develop from 
negotiations and consultations and are based on 
transparency, persuasion and consensus – leitmotifs 
that are reflected in the (decision-making) structures 
and composition of the OSCE as an institution.26 
 
23 Charter of Paris for a New Europe (Paris, 1990), 5, 
https://www.osce.org/mc/39516?download=true (accessed 16 
April 2019). 
24 See, e.g., ibid. 
25 Georgeta Pourchot, “The OSCE: A Pan-European Society 
in the Making?”, European Integration 33, no. 2 (March 2011): 
179–95 (180). 
26 Heinz Vetschera, “Cooperative Security – the Concept 
and its Application in South Eastern Europe”, in Approaching 
or Avoiding Cooperative Security? – The Western Balkans in the 
Aftermath of the Kosovo Settlement Proposal and the Riga Summit, 
ed. Ernst M. Felberbauer, Predrag Jureković and Frédéric 
Labarre (Vienna, 2007), 33–56 (34–40). 
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Although comprehensive security and 
cooperative security are constitutive 
guiding principles of the CSCE/OSCE, 
both concepts do raise questions. 
Unanswered Questions 
Although comprehensive security and cooperative 
security are constitutive guiding principles of the 
CSCE/OSCE, both concepts do raise questions. They 
have also prompted criticism of the OSCE and discus-
sion about reforming it. In principle, participating 
states continue to support the OSCE’s broad portfolio, 
which goes hand in hand with a comprehensive ap-
proach. However, assessments of what areas of re-
sponsibility the OSCE should prioritise, and how 
these should be fleshed out, as well as opinions about 
the right balance between the three dimensions, have 
always diverged considerably. These divergences 
reflect the states’ different interests and specific secu-
rity challenges. However, their emergence was also 
facilitated by the fact that there has thus far been 
little definition of the concept of comprehensive 
security. In most cases, reference is only made to the 
rough thematic division of the three dimensions. 
Especially in the early days of the CSCE, the compre-
hensive approach manifested itself in the form of 
“package solutions”: a combination of elements from 
different baskets.27 There is consensus that the three 
dimensions are interrelated in principle; however, 
how this can be implemented both operationally and 
conceptually has yet to be clarified. The OSCE’s 
Maastricht Strategy of 2003, which identifies security 
challenges in the new century, acknowledges that 
they can often no longer be assigned to a single 
dimension. The document lists numerous new threats 
transcending the three dimensions and emphasises 
that they can only be addressed by strengthening the 
OSCE’s multidimensional approach. However, how 
this envisaged “coordinated” implementation of the 
comprehensive approach should actually take shape 
is not explained here either.28 Monika Wohlfeld’s as-
 
27 Antonio Ortiz, “Neither Fox nor Hedgehog: NATO’s 
Comprehensive Approach and the OSCE’s Concept of 
Security”, Security and Human Rights 19, no. 4 (2008): 284–97 
(284–290); Dominguez, “Introduction” (see note 8), 19–20. 
The first explicit references to “comprehensive security” as a 
specific concept are found in texts from the 1990s. 
28 OSCE Strategy to Address Threats to Security and Stability in 
the Twenty-First Century, Vienna, December 2003, 
sessment that “the debate on the relative strength and 
relationship between the various dimensions of secu-
rity continues in the OSCE and will probably never 
leave its agenda” will likely continue to be valid.29 
It is not only the concept of comprehensive secu-
rity that is insufficiently defined. There are also un-
answered questions regarding the approach to coop-
erative security.30 At its core or as an ideal, the con-
cept of cooperative security is based on the premise 
that all countries involved have a genuine interest in 
cooperation and mutually beneficial exchange, and 
treat each other with goodwill.31 However, this read-
ing of cooperative security already presupposes the 
existence of a certain degree of trust as a basic condi-
tion for cooperation to occur in the first place – trust 
which is actually only generated by cooperation; at 
least, that is the hope associated with a revival of the 
second dimension. Some critics therefore tend to be 
sceptical about the cooperative-security approach, 
and consider the expectations associated with it as 
exaggerated. In Antonio Ortiz’s assessment, “the 
OSCE’s cooperative security is […] insufficient as it 
presumes from states an automatic goodwill and 
permanent good faith.”32 In fact, the debate on co-op-
erative security goes beyond the OSCE. It reflects dif-
ferent perspectives on international relations, which 
in turn are expressed in different assessments of 
states’ willingness to cooperate or tendency to com-
 
www.osce.org/mc/17504?download=true (accessed 16 April 
2019). 
29 Monika Wohlfeld, “Reconceptualizing of Security in the 
CSCE and OSCE”, in Globalization and Environmental Challenges. 
Reconceptualizing Security in the 21
st
 Century, ed. Hans Günter 
Brauch et al. (Berlin and Heidelberg, 2007), 643–50 (650). 
30 Keating and Wheeler consider the expression “coopera-
tive security” in general – meaning independently of its use 
within the OSCE – a ‘nebulous concept’ without clear defi-
nition: Vincent Keating and Nicholas J. Wheeler, “Concepts 
and Practices of Cooperative Security. Building Trust in the 
International System”, in The Legacy of the Cold War. Perspectives 
on Security, Cooperation, and Conflict, ed. Vojtech Mastny and 
Zhu Liqun (Lanham, 2013), 57–78 (59). See also Esko Antola, 
“The CSCE as a Collaborative Order”, in Processes of Inter-
national Negotiations, ed. Frances Mautner-Markhof (Boulder 
et al., 1989), 43–53 (43–45). 
31 The Charter of Paris for a New Europe, for example, 
states that the relations of the participating states should be 
based on “respect” and “cooperation”. 
32 Ortiz, “Neither Fox nor Hedgehog” (see note 27), 297; 
Vetschera, “Cooperative Security” (see note 26), 36. 
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pete, and the associated issue of the role that inter-
national organisations play.33 
The basic principles of the CSCE/OSCE 
associated with cooperative security 
may have enjoyed general recognition 
in principle, but their implementa-
tion has remained sketchy. 
Concrete developments in the OSCE area, from the 
bloody conflicts in the Balkans to the secession con-
flicts in the South Caucasus to, more recently, the 
Donbas conflict, have demonstrated the limits of the 
cooperative approach. The basic principles of the 
CSCE/OSCE associated with the concept may have 
enjoyed general recognition in principle, as do the de-
cisions based on them, but their practical implemen-
tation in the OSCE area has always remained sketchy.34 
Moreover, long-standing OSCE observers point out 
that the norms and principles of the Organisation are 
increasingly interpreted differently by participating 
states and that a “normative gap” has arisen with 
negative consequences for cooperative security.35 
In addition to these reservations about the concept 
of cooperative security, which have been deepened 
with recent developments, there are also differing 
assessments of the CSCE’s historic role, for example 
in overcoming the Cold War. A “return to Helsinki” 
is currently gathering support, yet various contempo-
rary witnesses and historical analyses, while certainly 
highlighting and acknowledging the merits of the 
CSCE, have come to more circumscribed conclusions 
regarding its influence on the upheaval in world 
history during the late 1980s. For these critics, the 
CSCE was more an expression of the general world 
political climate than an effective agent of change. 
According to US historian Cathal J. Nolan, the CSCE 
was “more a barometer of than a cause of the level of 
detente” and “more […] a stenographer than an ex-
ecutive of change”.36 
 
33 John Baylis, “European Security between the ‘Logic of 
Anarchy’ and the ‘Logic of Community’”, in Redefining Euro-
pean Security, ed. Carl C. Hodge (New York and London, 1999), 
13–28. 
34 Kamp, “The Power of Institutions” (see note 1), S. 81–
82; Pourchot, “The OSCE” (see note 25), 185. 
35 OSCE Network of Think Tanks and Academic Institu-
tions, European Security – Challenges at the Societal Level (Ham-
burg, 2016), 15, 30. 
36 Cathal J. Nolan, “The OSCE: Nonmilitary Dimensions of 
Cooperative Security in Europe”, in Redefining European Secu-
 
 
rity, ed. Hodge (see note 33), 299–332 (310, 312); see also 
Baylis, “European Security” (see note 33), 24; Mastny, The 
Helsinki Process (see note 22), 4; Kalevi J. Holsti, “Bargaining 
Theory and Diplomatic Reality: the CSCE Negotiations”, 
Review of International Studies 8, no. 3 (1982): 159–70 (167). 
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In line with the concept of comprehensive security, 
economic and environmental issues have been part 
of the CSCE/OSCE’s field of activity from the outset. 
Already in 1975, cooperation on economic, scientific, 
technological and environmental issues was among 
the ten principles laid down in the Final Act of the 
Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe 
(Helsinki Final Act). This cooperation formed the 
second of the “three baskets”. Documents from the 
early days of the CSCE list a wealth of topics subsumed 
under the “second basket”, from scientific contacts to 
industrial cooperation and trade to the protection of 
the marine environment. This diversity mirrored the 
challenges of enabling an exchange between two 
completely different economic and social systems.37 
With the collapse of the Soviet Union, however, 
the latter issue faded away. A new task became key: 
to support the transition of the former socialist coun-
tries to functioning and sustainable market econo-
mies. Thus, in the 1990 Document of the Bonn Conference 
on Economic Co-operation in Europe, the participating 
states recognised the “relationship between political 
pluralism and market economies” and further ac-
knowledged that democratic institutions and econom-
ic freedom advance economic and social progress.38 
 
37 OSCE, OSCE Economic and Environmental Dimension Commit-
ments. Reference Manual 2018 (Vienna, 2018), 17. Kurt P. 
Tudyka, “The Second Basket: Evolution of the Economic and 
Environmental Dimension of the OSCE”, in OSCE Yearbook 
2016, ed. IFSH (Baden-Baden, 2018), 295–307 (295). 
38 CSCE, Document of the Bonn Conference on Economic Co-opera-
tion in Europe (Bonn, 11 April 1990), 2, 4; OSCE, OSCE Economic 
and Environmental Dimension (see note 37), 74–76; see also 
Hakan Karaaslan, “An Analysis of the Economic and Envi-
ronmental Dimension of the Organization for Security and 
Cooperation in Europe: Just a Rhetoric or Reality?”, Bolu 
The Economic Forum (later Economic and Environ-
mental Forum, EEF),39 founded in 1992, was also in-
tended to promote the political and economic trans-
formation of former socialist states. The annual con-
cluding meeting of the EEF has been the most impor-
tant and high-ranking event in the annual calendar 
of the second dimension.40 The annual meeting is de-
signed as a platform for dialogue, and aims to provide 
political impetus and strategic orientation for coop-
eration between states in the economic and environ-
mental fields in support of other, more operational 
international organisations.41 
In particular with the adoption of the OSCE Strategy 
Document for the Economic and Environmental Dimension in 
2003, the second dimension received greater atten-
tion, including within the Organisation itself. The 
paper identified new challenges and threats to Euro-
pean economic and environmental security in the 
light of developments over the previous decade, in-
cluding a deepening of socio-economic inequalities, 
growing poverty and unemployment, increasing 
environmental degradation, and shortcomings in 
 
Abant İzzet Baysal University Journal of Graduate School of Social 
Sciences 18, no. 1 (2018): 165–91. 
39 In 2006 the Economic Forum was renamed the Econom-
ic and Environmental Forum (EEF) in order to better reflect 
its thematic scope. 
40 The Economic and Environmental Forum now consists 
of a total of three dates: the key concluding meeting is pre-
ceded by two preparatory meetings. 
41 OSCE Strategy Document for the Economic and Environmental 
Dimension (Maastricht, 2003), www.osce.org/eea/ 
20705?download=true (accessed 30 August 2019); OSCE, 
Economic and Environmental Forum: 20 Years (Vienna, 2012), 
www.osce.org/secretariat/98230 (accessed 16 April 2019). 
OSCE, OSCE Economic and Environmental Dimension (see note 37), 
103. 
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governance. Participating states also outlined how 
they intend to respond jointly to these problems and 
threats in individual fields, and what possibilities 
they saw for strengthening the OSCE accordingly.42 
For example, they wanted to increase the impact of 
the Economic Forum as a key event of the second 
dimension. According to an OSCE decision of the 
following year, the EEF should be used even more 
strongly and purposefully for political dialogue be-
tween the participating states on key economic and 
environmental challenges and their impact on Euro-
pean security.43 Two years before the Maastricht 
strategy document, in 2001, the Economic Forum had 
already been joined by another body. The Economic 
and Environmental Subcommittee (later renamed 
the Economic and Environmental Committee, EEC), 
which meets regularly in Vienna, was meant to 
strengthen the second dimension structurally, pro-
viding a space in between EEF meetings for OSCE 
delegations to exchange views on economic and 
environmental issues and their security policy im-
plications on an ongoing basis.44 
Unlike in the other two dimensions, there are no 
separate institutions assigned to the economic and 
environmental dimension.45 Since 1997, however, the 
Office of the Coordinator of OSCE Economic and 
Environmental Activities (OCEEA) has been active in 
the Vienna Secretariat of the Organisation. Reporting 
directly to the Secretary General, it maintains contact 
with the OSCE’s field missions and assists participat-
ing states in translating second dimension decisions 
into national laws and regulations. The OCEEA pro-
vides training courses and seminars aimed at capacity 
building and the dissemination of best practices, 
often conducted in cooperation with field missions, 
and it also has a monitoring function as part of the 
OSCE’s early warning role.46 The thematic radius of 
the OCEEA (and the field missions) results from the 
consensual decisions of the OSCE Ministerial Council, 
which at times entrust the OCEEA with specific (fol-
low-up) tasks, as well as from the respective priorities 
 
42 OSCE, OSCE Economic and Environmental Dimension (see 
note 37), 155–71. 
43 Ibid, 206. 
44 Ibid, 147–148. 
45 See, e.g., the OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions 
and Human Rights (ODIHR) in Warsaw as an institution of 
the third dimension. 
46 To identify emerging crises and challenges at an early 
stage – and then to react accordingly – is one of the OSCE’s 
primary tasks, along with conflict prevention and resolution. 
set by the annually changing OSCE chairmanships. 
The Co-ordinator reports regularly on his work to the 
delegations in the Permanent Council, the OSCE’s 
weekly decision-making body. In general, however, 
interaction with the delegations is somewhat limited 
or happens more effectively at bi- or minilateral level, 
for example within the framework of targeted project 
financing, when participating states (individually or 
in combination) initiate specific projects through 
extra-budgetary contributions.47 
Despite its scope, the second 
dimension remained organisationally 
and conceptually underdeveloped 
compared to the first and third. 
Despite the wealth of issues falling within its scope 
and its gradual institutional anchoring following the 
end of the Cold War, the second dimension remained 
organisationally and conceptually underdeveloped 
compared to the first and third. Moreover, the imple-
mented projects were often too small to significantly 
reduce economic and environmental challenges.48 
The Economic and Environmental Forum has been 
accused of failing over the years to fulfil its task of 
facilitating a comprehensive debate between political 
decision-makers and representatives of business, 
 
47 In 2009 the informal working group on ways to enhance 
the second dimension noted critically in its report that par-
ticipating states focused their attention on the topics set by 
the respective chairmanship, but then showed little interest 
in the OCEEA’s further work on earlier priorities. Coordina-
tion between the delegations and the staff of field missions 
entrusted with economic and environmental issues was said 
to be even less developed: Findings and Recommendations of the 
Chairman of the Informal Working Group of Friends on the Future 
Orientation of the Economic and Environmental Dimension of the 
OSCE, Chairmanship’s Report, CIO/GAL/97/09 (28 July 2009), 
5; 11/12, http://bit.ly/2kDWYGh (accessed 16 April 2019). 
48 Kilian Strauss points out that OSCE projects often have a 
signalling or catalytic effect, attracting projects with a wider 
reach by other, more resource-intensive, organisations. 
Payam Foroughi, on the other hand, arrives at a much more 
pessimistic assessment, accusing the OSCE of “projecteritis”, 
a tendency that does more harm than good on the ground, 
Kilian Strauss, “Economic and Environmental Security 
Should Remain Key Components of the OSCE’s Core Man-
date”, in OSCE Yearbook 2008, ed. IFSH (Baden-Baden, 2009), 
311–19 (314); Payam Foroughi, “The Helsinki Final Act Four 
Decades on”, Central Asian Survey 36, no. 3 (2017): 293–99 
(296). 
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academia and civil society.49 Torbjørn Bjorvatn, who 
has worked within the OSCE on the economic and 
environmental dimension, summarised the deficits as 
follows: “Despite continued efforts to boost its signifi-
cance and impact, the 2nd dimension has never at-
tained the political leverage or conceptual coherence 
of the other two dimensions”.50 Even after the institu-
tional expansions, the economic and environmental 
dimension remained the OSCE’s “stepchild”. 
 
 
49 Tudyka, “The Second Basket” (see note 37). See also: 
International Peace Institute, Economic Connectivity. A Basis for 
Rebuilding Stability and Confidence in Europe? (Vienna, 2016), 1; 
John de Fonblanque, “Strengthening the Economic and 
Environmental Dimension of the OSCE (EED)”, Helsinki Moni-
tor 16, no. 3 (September 2005): 180–83 (181); Victor-Yves 
Ghébali, The OSCE between Crisis and Reform: Towards a New Lease 
on Life, DCAF Policy Paper 10/2005 (Geneva: DCAF, November 
2005), 5. 
50 Torbjørn Bjorvatn, The OSCE’s Economic and Environmental 
Dimension: Enhancing Relevance and Impact, Nordem Thematic 
Paper Series (Oslo: University of Oslo, Norwegian Centre for 
Human Rights, 2014), 3. 
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Given the aforementioned shortcomings, it is not 
surprising that the debate on a possible upgrading 
and increased visibility of the OSCE’s economic and 
environmental dimension is longstanding. A number 
of Ministerial Council decisions aimed at strengthen-
ing the economic and environmental dimension, as 
well as food-for-thought and discussion papers, which 
were often developed within or at the request of the 
OSCE, had this objective in mind.51 The vast majority 
of these initiatives, however, dates back to the period 
before the crisis in and around Ukraine. The “rediscov-
ery” of the second dimension in recent years, on the 
other hand, is precisely a reaction to the changed 
security environment since 2014 and the associated 
change in perception of the OSCE’s importance. 
The Activation of the Second Dimension 
and the Role of Chairmanships since 2014 
The upgrading of the second dimension is particularly 
linked to the OSCE chairmanships of recent years 
 
51 See Findings and Recommendations (see note 47); OSCE, 
The 18
th
 OSCE Economic and Environmental Forum. Part II, 24–26 
May 2010 Prague. Follow-up Ideas, EEF.GAL/6/10 (Vienna, 17 
May 2010), www.osce.org/eea/68086?download=true; OSCE, 
Workshop on Economic and Environmental Activities as Confidence-
building Measures, CIO.INF/29/11 (27 May 2011), 
www.osce.org/cio/78201?download=true (both accessed 
16 April 2019); International Peace Institute, Responding to 
Natural Disasters: What Role for the OSCE? (Vienna, June 2011); 
Bjorvatn, The OSCE’s Economic and Environmental Dimension (see 
note 50); Fonblanque, “Strengthening the Economic and 
Environmental Dimension” (see note 49); Piotr Switalski, 
“The Economic Dimension – in Search of OSCE Added 
Value”, in OSCE Yearbook 1999, ed. IFSH (Baden-Baden, 2000), 
367–75; Frank Evers, Balancing by Cross-Linking. Renewed 
Dialogue on the OSCE Economic and Environmental Dimension, 
CORE Working Paper 21/2010 (Hamburg: CORE, October 
2010). 
(Switzerland/Serbia, Germany, Austria, Italy, Slovakia) 
and their efforts to (better) harness what they con-
sider the unused bridging potential of economic and 
environmental issues in view of the current threats to 
European security.52 The countries holding the OSCE 
chairmanship are of particular importance because of 
the political leadership they provide during the one-
year term, and the influence they thus have on the 
agenda. 
The revitalisation of the second 
dimension aims to harness the 
bridging potential of economic and 
environmental issues. 
The 2014 Swiss chairmanship marked the begin-
ning of the revival. The extent of the tensions that 
would arise in the context of the crisis in and around 
Ukraine could hardly have been foreseen when 
Switzerland set the priorities for its term of office. 
Yet, at the concluding meeting of the Economic and 
Environmental Forum in autumn 2014, and thus 
after the annexation of Crimea by Russia, Didier 
Burkhalter, then Swiss Foreign Minister and OSCE 
Chairperson-in-Office, justified the envisaged upgrad-
ing of the second dimension by pointing to these 
political – and thus to the related economic – dis-
tortions. Burkhalter suggested extending the classic 
instruments and tasks of the OSCE, such as confidence-
 
52 The second dimension’s specific potential for confi-
dence-building measures has been discussed in individual 
policy papers, see, e.g. Stefan Wolff, Economic Diplomacy and 
Connectivity. What Role for the OSCE? (Birmingham, 2018), 
https://www.birmingham.ac.uk/Documents/college-social-
sciences/government-society/iccs/news-events/2018/Osce-
Report.pdf (accessed 16 April 2019); International Peace 
Institute, Economic Connectivity (see note 49); OSCE Network of 
Think Tanks and Academic Institutions, OSCE Confidence Build-
ing in the Economic and Environmental Dimension. Current Oppor-
tunities and Constraints (Vienna, 2017). 
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building measures and monitoring, to economic 
issues; the OSCE would also serve as a platform for an 
inclusive debate on the nexus between the economy 
and security.53 With the latter idea, Burkhalter took 
up earlier demands for upgrading the EEF, as out-
lined. 
With regard to the second dimension, the Swiss 
“crisis chairmanship”54 is also associated with the 
concept of “connectivity”, even though this term had 
not yet found its way into the official OSCE vocabu-
lary in 2014. This happened two years later: Germa-
ny’s OSCE chairmanship in 2016 continued from that 
of the Swiss in the economic and environmental 
fields to the extent that the German government 
adopted the concept of “connectivity”55 and, in com-
bination with a focus on “good governance”, placed it 
at the centre of its work on the second dimension. It 
wanted the concept of connectivity not only to give 
new relevance specifically to the economic and 
environmental dimension, but also have it serve the 
chairmanship’s overall objective of “renewing dia-
logue” and “rebuilding trust”.56 The Special Repre-
sentative of the German government for the OSCE 
Chairmanship, Gernot Erler, emphasised in his speech 
at the concluding meeting of the EEF 2016 that eco-
nomic issues were to be given more weight within the 
OSCE framework and that, in particular, an increase 
in connectivity should be seen as “a scenario that has 
winners on both sides, a scenario that can help to 
 
53 “More Economic and Environmental Cooperation for More Secu-
rity in Europe”. Opening Address by Didier Burkhalter, Chairperson-
in-Office of the OSCE, 22
nd
 OSCE Economic and Environmental Forum, 
Prague 10 September 2014, EEF.DEL/37/14 (10 September 2014), 
www.osce.org/whoweare/123396?download=true (accessed 
20 August 2019). 
54 Heidi Grau, “The 2014 Swiss OSCE Chairmanship: Be-
tween “Routine” and “Crisis”, in OSCE Yearbook 2014, ed. IFSH 
(Baden-Baden, 2015), 25–S40 (26ff.). 
55 From the German perspective, “sustainable connectivi-
ty” comprises better physical and virtual interconnectedness, 
for instance increased customs cooperation, cross-border 
transport infrastructure, or aligning investment conditions, 
cf. German government, Renewing dialogue, rebuilding trust, 
restoring security. The priorities of the German OSCE Chairmanship 
in 2016 (Berlin, 2016), 9. However, there is no binding OSCE 
definition of the term “connectivity”. 
56 OSCE, Report by the 2016 German OSCE Chairmanship, 
CIO.GAL/219/16 (23 December 2016), 84–86, 
http://www.osce.org/chairmanship/307311?download=true 
(accessed 16 April 2019). 
reduce political tensions”.57 A few months earlier, the 
then Foreign Minister Frank-Walter Steinmeier had 
already expressed similar views at the opening of the 
business conference “Connectivity for Commerce and 
Investment”, a forum which the German government 
subsequently lauded as a flagship event of the second 
dimension under its chairmanship. Especially in 
times of crisis, Steinmeier said, “political visions” had 
to be discussed, and economic cooperation in the 
service of building trust had a special role to play in 
these situations.58 The German chairmanship’s con-
cern to intensify the dialogue between participating 
states under the banner of the guiding principle “con-
nectivity”, increase their willingness to cooperate, and 
thus make better use of the bridging function of the 
economic and environmental dimension, was ful-
filled at least to the extent that a resolution in favour 
of this approach was agreed at the 2016 Ministerial 
Council in Hamburg.59 The term “connectivity” thus 
entered the official terminology of the OSCE. 
The subsequent Austrian chairmanship in 2017 as 
well pursued the topic of “economic connectivity” 
alongside its own priorities of “green economy” and 
“economic participation”. Austria also explicitly justi-
fied its choice of topics with the aim of better exploit-
ing the trust-building and tension-reducing potential 
of the second dimension: “The economic and environ-
mental dimension provides an excellent basis for 
mutually beneficial cooperation among the partici-
pating States”, the chairmanship’s programme states. 
With reference to the previous chairs, its optimistic 
interim assessment was that the “concept of econom-
ic connectivity has set us on the path to address these 
 
57 Keynote Speech by the Special Representative for the German 
OSCE Chairmanship 2016 Dr. Gernot Erler at the 24
th
 OSCE Econom-
ic and Environmental Forum in Prague (14 September 2016), 
https://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/en/newsroom/news/160914-
erler-eef/283390 (accessed 16 April 2019). 
58 Speech by Foreign Minister Frank-Walter Steinmeier at the open-
ing of the business conference organised by the German OSCE Chair-
manship “Connectivity for Commerce and Investment” (18 May 
2016), https://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/en/newsroom/news/-
/280726 (accessed 12 September 2019). 
59 OSCE, Ministerial Council, Decision No. 4/16. Strengthening 
Good Governance and Promoting Connectivity, MC.DEC/4/16 
(9 December 2016), www.osce.org/cio/289316?download=true 
(accessed 16 April 2019). 
 The Activation of the Second Dimension and the Role of Chairmanships since 2014 
 SWP Berlin 
 Cooperation, Trust, Security? 
 December 2019 
 19 
increasing divisions”.60 The 2017 OSCE Ministerial 
Council in Vienna, however, only agreed on a resolu-
tion to promote economic participation; another 
resolution, on cooperation on environmental matters, 
did not find consensus.  
The Italian chairmanship also gave its own im-
petus to the economic and environmental dimension 
with a focus on the topics of digitisation and human 
capital development in the digital age. Like the pre-
vious chairmanships, the Italian government adhered 
to the OSCE troika concept, i.e. to the rule of co-ordi-
nating the current chairmanship’s work programme 
with the predecessor’s and successor’s agendas. Con-
sequently, Italy also highlighted interfaces with the 
priorities of connectivity and economic participation. 
The Italian chairmanship similarly justified the 
choice of topics by explaining that discussion of these 
issues and the search for common solutions to com-
mon challenges offered an opportunity to renew trust 
between participating states. It is precisely the eco-
nomic and environmental dimension, the programme 
states, which offers a framework for agreement on 
“common and less conflicting interests”.61 At the 
Ministerial Council in Milan in December 2018, a 
decision on “Human Capital Development in the 
Digital Era” and a declaration on the “Digital Econo-
my” were adopted.62 Italy, like Germany in 2016, 
could thus claim to have developed a new term for 
the OSCE and anchored it in corresponding resolu-
tions. But the OSCE is far from a platform for setting 
 
60 Programme of the Austrian OSCE Chairmanship for Presenta-
tion to Participating States, 2017, 3, www.osce.org/cio/ 
293066?download=true; see also: Welcoming Remarks by 
Dr. Hans Jörg Schelling, Minister of Finance, Austria, 25
th
 OSCE 
Economic and Environmental Forum, EEF.DEL/42/17 (Prague, 6 
September 2017), www.osce.org/chairmanship/ 
338081?download=true; Opening Address by Deputy Foreign 
Minister Michael Linhart, First Preparatory Meeting of the 25
th
 OSCE 
Economic and Environmental Forum “Greening the Economy and 
Building Partnerships for Security” (23 January 2017), 
http://bit.ly/2lUsBLF (all accessed 20 August 2019). 
61 Dialogue, Ownership, Responsibility. Programme of the Italian 
OSCE Chairmanship 2018 (January 2018), 
www.esteri.it/mae/resource/doc/2018/01/prog-osce-100118-
d.pdf (accessed 17 April 2019). 
62 OSCE, Ministerial Council, Decision No. 5/18. Human Capi-
tal Development in the Digital Era, MC.DEC/5/18 (Milan, 7 Decem-
ber 2018), www.osce.org/chairmanship/405899?down 
load=true; idem., Declaration on the Digital Economy as a Driver 
for Promoting Cooperation, Security and Growth, MC.DOC/2/18 
(Milan, 7 December 2018), www.osce.org/chairmanship/ 
405920?download=true (both accessed 17 April 2019). 
international standards in these areas, as the Italian 
representative promised in his closing speech at the 
first preparatory meeting of the EEF in 2018.63 
In 2019, Slovakia has chaired the OSCE. It, too, 
promised to maintain programmatic continuity with 
its predecessors. In the second dimension, the focus 
initiated by Italy on digitisation has been maintained, 
linked to energy cooperation, good (environmental) 
governance and connectivity.64 Nevertheless, in the 
context of the continuing crisis of European security, 
a certain disillusionment with the bridge-building 
potential of the second dimension already seems to 
be settling in. In his inaugural address, the Slovak 
Foreign Minister and OSCE Chairperson-in-Office, 
Miroslav Lajčák, emphasised that he was deliberately 
avoiding another general call for cooperation, as 
these had too often remained unanswered. Instead, 
he advocated more realism.65 
 
63 “Closing Statement by Alessandro Azzoni, Chairperson 
of the OSCE Permanent Council, First Preparatory Meeting 
of the 26
th
 Economic and Environmental Forum”, 
EEF.DEL/17/18 (Vienna, 24 January 2018), 
www.osce.org/chairmanship/367711?download=true (ac-
cessed 17 April 2019). 
64 Accordingly, the title of the 2019 EEF cycle is “Promot-
ing Economic Progress and Security in the OSCE Area 
through Energy Cooperation, New Technologies, Good Gov-
ernance and Connectivity in the Digital Era”. 
65 ”Statement by the Chairperson in Office H. E. Miroslav 
Lajčák. Presentation of Priorities”, CIO.GAL/4/19 (Vienna, 
10 January 2019), www.osce.org/chairmanship/408602? 
download=true (accessed 19 April 2019). 
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Slovakia’s realism regarding the conflict-solving 
potential of cooperation in the second dimension ad-
dresses a fundamental point: the connection between 
cooperation, trust and security – as assumed by 
the bridge-builder metaphor that is often used with 
respect to the second dimension – is as blurred as 
the OSCE’s core concepts of cooperative and com-
prehensive security. The academic debate on the 
subject reflects this.66 
Cost-Benefit Calculation vs. Social Bonds 
Proponents of a revival of the second dimension 
argue that cooperation in seemingly less contentious 
areas, such as the economy and the environment, 
can be a means of building trust, which is in turn a 
condition for creating more security and stability in 
Europe. However, this causal chain is by no means 
borne out by the academic literature, especially in its 
general applicability. From a rationalist perspective, 
cooperation can also be entered into for purely (or 
primarily) strategic reasons. Whether or not coopera-
tion occurs is therefore a question of interests and 
incentives, and dependent on the assessment whether 
it will pay off against the background of an individu-
al cost-benefit calculation. Referring to the second 
dimension as a potential framework for win-win 
situations is based more on such an understanding. 
Under these circumstances, however, cooperation is 
not proof that the relationship between the actors 
involved is characterised by trust, or that it generates 
trust. At best, it is an indication of the confidence of 
those involved that their respective calculations will 
 
66 Laura Considine, “‘Back to the Rough Ground!’ A Gram-
matical Approach to Trust and International Relations”, 
Millennium 44, no. 1 (2015): 109–27 (110). 
be successful.67 In fact, in a globalised interdependent 
world, cooperation is more the rule than the excep-
tion68 – without any obligation or need to see that 
cooperation as an expression of trust between the 
actors. 
What is meant by trust influences the answer to 
the question of whether trust also (inevitably and 
sustainably) means a higher degree of security, and 
whether and how trust can be actively brought about 
through specific measures. Here, the distinction in 
the English-language debate on trust in international 
relations is very illuminating. It differentiates be-
tween trust on the one hand and confidence (occasional-
ly also reliance), on the other. Confidence describes the 
result of strategic calculation(s), while trust at the very 
least additionally emphasises a social relationship 
linked to positive emotions and mutual goodwill, 
which is ultimately based on a common identity, and 
shared values and ideas.69 Although the existence of 
 
67 Vincent Charles Keating and Jan Ruzicka, “Trusting 
Relationships in International Politics: No Need to Hedge”, 
Review of International Studies 40, no. 4 (2014): 753–70; Jona-
than Mercer, “Rationality and Psychology in International 
Politics”, International Organization 59, no. 1 (January 2005): 
77–106; Aaron M. Hoffman, “A Conceptualization of Trust 
in International Relations”, European Journal of International 
Relations 8, no. 3 (2002): 375–401. 
68 The current debate on the implementation of economic 
sanctions as an extraordinary means of foreign policy under-
lines this point. 
69 Clara Weinhardt, “Relational Trust in International 
Cooperation: The Case of North-South Trade Negotiations”, 
Journal of Trust Research 5, no. 1 (2015) (Special Issue: Trust in 
International Relations – A Useful Tool?): 27–54 (32–34); 
Christopher Andrejis Berzins differentiates two components 
of trust, “risk management” and “relationship management”: 
Christopher Andrejis Berzins, The Puzzle of Trust in International 
Relations: Risk and Relationship Management in the Organisation for 
Security and Cooperation in Europe, PhD Thesis, London School 
of Economics (London, 2004). 
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this (genuine) kind of trust is accompanied by lower 
threat perception on the part of the actors involved – 
and thus ultimately with a higher level of security – 
it is also much more difficult to achieve.70 
How the process that leads from 
increased cooperation to trust and 
finally to increased security actually 
works is not delineated. 
In fact, there are still many questions to be an-
swered on the interrelationships of trust, inter-
governmental cooperation and international security. 
Notwithstanding this, trust-building is often (simplis-
tically) equated with increased cooperation or gener-
ally accepted as its result. How the process leading, or 
supposedly leading, from increased cooperation to 
trust and finally to increased security actually works 
is not often delineated. The expectations attached 
to such an undifferentiated understanding of trust- 
respectively confidence-building measures are there-
fore often exaggerated. The fact that a wide variety of 
measures and policies are nevertheless increasingly 
labelled as such seems to express hope rather than 
reliable findings.71 
In OSCE statements and writings as well, there are 
few indications as to how exactly trust and ultimately 
security can be generated through cooperation in 
economic and environmental spheres. Yet elsewhere 
(as in the concept of cooperative security) it is as-
sumed that cooperation presupposes a minimum 
degree of trust, although it is not clear what this 
minimum trust should be based on.72 Against this 
background, it may not be a contradiction, but rather 
 
70 Torsten Michel, “Time to Get Emotional: Phronetic Re-
flections on the Concept of Trust in International Relations”, 
European Journal of International Relations 19, no. 4 (2013): 
869–90 (873, 880); Berzins, The Puzzle of Trust (see note 69), 
18. 
71 An example of a sceptical assessment of what trust- or 
confidence-building measures can achieve specifically in the 
CSCE/OSCE context is Marie-France Desjardins, Rethinking 
Confidence-Building Measures. Obstacles to Agreement and the Risks 
of Overselling the Process, Adelphi Paper 307/1996 (London: 
International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1996); Berzins, 
The Puzzle of Trust (see note 69), 37–48.  
72 Keating and Wheeler point out that even if a state sends 
out trust signals, these still do not have to be perceived as 
such by the addressee. Instead, they might well be interpret-
ed as weakness or a ruse: Keating and Wheeler, “Concepts 
and Practices of Cooperative Security” (see note 30), 69. 
logical, that a 2017 OSCE decision in the economic 
and environmental dimension first posits peace, good 
international relations, security and stability as “cru-
cial for the creation of a climate of confidence” and 
then, almost in the next paragraph, posits economic 
cooperation as a motor for stability and security. In 
one scenario, security and stability are at the begin-
ning of the causal chain; in the other, at the end.73 
“Spillover” between Dimensions or 
Increasing Separation? 
Just as the success of trust-building measures is not a 
foregone conclusion, neither is the effect of coopera-
tion and trust generated in a specific policy field on 
other fields.74 The assumption that there are such 
positive spillover effects testifies to a functionalist 
understanding of cooperation as developed very spe-
cifically to explain the progress of European inte-
gration in the mid-20th century. Detached from the 
specific case above, the hypothesis underpinning this 
thinking could be formulated as follows: cooperation 
in areas with better chances of success – i.e. less 
contentious issues, where there is an intersection of 
common interests, or supposedly less politicized or 
securitised (welfare) issues (“low politics”) – has a 
positive effect on other areas with greater conflicts 
of interest or with more entrenched issues (“high 
politics”).75 However, how this can be achieved is 
not clear. There is no automatic link between “low 
politics” and “high politics”, by which changes in one 
area result in changes in the other, or make them 
absolutely inevitable. Without sufficient interrela-
tionships or dependencies between fields or topics, 
without a favourable political environment and a 
corresponding will on the part of actors, decoupling 
 
73 OSCE, Ministerial Council, Decision No. 8/17. Promoting 
Economic Participation in the OSCE Area, MC.DEC/8/17/Corr.1 
(Vienna, 8 December 2017), 
www.osce.org/chairmanship/361566?download=true (ac-
cessed 26 April 2019). 
74 Jan Ruzicka and Vincent Charles Keating, “Going 
Global: Trust Research and International Relations”, Journal 
of Trust Research 5, no. 1 (2015): 8–26. 
75 Thomas Gehring, “Integrating Integration Theory: Neo-
functionalism and International Regimes”, Global Society 10, 
no. 3 (1996): 225–53. 
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of the areas is just as likely to result as a positive 
“cascade effect”.76 
Research on security communities also points to 
the fact that states make use of quite different, some-
times conflicting, practices in their foreign policy.77 
Simply because mechanisms based on the balance of 
power and those based on a cooperative approach 
operate alongside each other does not mean that 
there is an inevitable transition from one order to the 
other. Those involved in the mechanisms may well 
switch between the sets of practices that are charac-
teristic of both systems of security governance, or 
make use of them situatively. For example, practices 
may differ functionally and coexist according to 
specific policies and issues. According to the literature 
on security communities, spillover between policy 
areas therefore cannot necessarily be assumed.78 
Spillover from one dimension to 
another is not automatic. 
For the OSCE, this means that there is no automat-
ic positive spillover from one dimension to another 
and no automatic constructive influence of coopera-
tion in economic and environmental matters on 
cooperation in military and human aspects of secu-
rity.79 When we consider that the willingness to 
cooperate may just as well be based exclusively on 
national interests and cost-benefit calculations, rather 
than primarily on deep-rooted positive trusting rela-
tions, it becomes clear that these considerations may 
vary greatly by subject and actor. It could therefore 
be precisely in the interest of a given participating 
state not to bind the dimensions of the OSCE and its 
specific contents closely; or it could be its foreign 
policy strategy to make use of both power-based and 
 
76 Terms such as “spill-around” or “spill-back” in the aca-
demic debate signal criticism of the inevitability of spillover 
assumed in earlier functionalist approaches, Arne Niemann, 
“Neofunctionalism and EU Internal Security Cooperation”, in 
Theorizing Internal Security Cooperation in the European Union, ed. 
Raphael Bossong and Mark Rhinard (Oxford, 2016), 129–52. 
77 Emanuel Adler and Patricia Greve, “When Security 
Community Meets Balance of Power: Overlapping Regional 
Mechanisms of Security Governance”, Review of International 
Studies 35 (2009): 59–84. 
78 Ibid., 80. 
79 Earlier analyses already pointed out the lack of integra-
tion of the economic and environmental dimension into the 
work of the other dimensions: see, e.g. Evers, Balancing by 
Cross-Linking (see note 51). 
cooperative practices, depending on the issue at 
stake.80 
The OSCE’s Philosophy Revisited 
There is thus much to be said for a conservative 
assessment of the potential of the OSCE’s economic 
and environmental dimension to generate trust and 
spillover across dimensions. Building sustainable 
trust in a targeted manner is not only difficult in 
itself: as well as the political will of the actors in-
volved (which is necessary) the success of such a pro-
ject also depends on a favourable political context. 
Otherwise, there is ultimately a risk that measures 
conceived as trust-building become “advantage-
building measures”81 in practice. Moreover, a look at 
the past shows that the limits and barriers to positive 
spillover across the dimensions were already being 
discussed – and critically examined – at the time of 
the CSCE. Ultimately, according to commentators at 
the time, the difficulty of generating positive spillover 
was also inherent in the concept of the CSCE itself: 
more precisely, in the inherent tension between 
cooperative relations on the one hand and military 
security on the other. As explained above, the com-
plexity of the CSCE (and also of the subsequent OSCE) 
lies in the fact that two different understandings of 
international order coexist within it: (1) a competitive 
understanding expressed in the military dimension, 
and (2) a cooperative understanding of the inter-
national order ascribing common interests to states.82 
 
80 For example, Elena Kropatcheva observes in her analysis 
of Russia’s actions in the Organisation an approach of “com-
pensatory cooperation” in certain OSCE areas that leaves 
open as many options as possible for Moscow: Elena Kropa-
tcheva, “Russia and the Role of the OSCE in European Secu-
rity: A ‘Forum’ for Dialogue or a ‘Battlefield’ of Interests?”, 
European Security 21, no. 3 (2012): 370–94. 
81 Mastny, The Helsinki Process (see note 22), 19. On the 
potentially negative impact of confidence-building measures, 
see also Desjardins, Rethinking Confidence-Building Measures (see 
note 71). 
82 Antola, “The CSCE as a Collaborative Order” (see note 
30), 47–48, 50. Theresa Callan formulates it somewhat dif-
ferently, referring to a “credibility gap between the reality of 
state interests and the rhetoric of [the OSCE’s] architectural 
plans”: Theresa Callan, “Word Games and War-Games: 
The OSCE and its Quest for ‘Comprehensive Security’”, Paper 
presented at the ECPR Joint Sessions, 26-31 March 1999 
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The conclusion drawn at that time on the question 
of whether these opposing patterns of thought and 
action could ever be reconciled in political practice 
was sobering: the different logics of “cooperation” 
and (military) “security” were found to be difficult to 
bridge. We might add that, beyond the difference 
between cooperative and power-based practices, the 
concept of security itself is sometimes interpreted 
differently in the three dimensions. Security in the 
form of stability for collective actors (states) can also 
mean security at the level of the individual, but not 
necessarily. Instead of security as stability (sometimes 
achieved through the application of coercion, moni-
toring, and the restriction of basic rights), an under-
standing of security as emancipation can be applied 
at the individual level – for example, in the sense of 
reducing structural disadvantage.83 
 
(Mannheim, 31 March 1999), 13. See also Baylis, “European 
Security” (see note 33). 
83 Ali Bilgic, “Security through Trust-building in the Euro-
Mediterranean Cooperation: Two Perspectives for the Partner-
ship”, Southeast European and Black Sea Studies 10, no. 4 (2010): 
457–73; see also João Nunes, “Reclaiming the Political: 
Emancipation and Critique in Security Studies”, Security 
Dialogue 43, no. 4 (2012): 345–61. 
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It is not only the statement of the Slovak Chairperson-
in-Office that reveals a certain scepticism about the 
envisaged positive effects of calls for cooperation. 
Although in recent years four different EU members 
(Germany, Austria, Italy, Slovakia) have pursued the 
revitalisation of the second dimension, there are quite 
different views within the EU on the extent to which 
economic and environmental issues should be tackled 
in order to build trust, and what significance the 
second dimension should actually have within the 
OSCE.84 For example, the Nordic countries tend to 
believe that there should be no “business as usual” in 
view of the still unresolved conflict in and around 
Ukraine.85 Outside the circle of EU member states, the 
USA and Canada take a similar stance within the 
OSCE. They emphasise that dealing with (supposedly) 
less controversial issues such as economic connectivi-
ty or digitisation should not come at the expense of 
established “OSCE core issues”; neither should coop-
eration on these issues obscure the fact that some 
participating states disregard key OSCE principles and 
obligations by, among other things, violating human 
rights and depriving their citizens of basic freedoms.86 
 
84 Participating states’ differing assessments of the signifi-
cance of the second dimension are more of a constant than 
an expression of recent developments, see Evers, Balancing by 
Cross-Linking (see note 51), 4, 12. 
85 The Nordic countries in particular also ensure that 
engagement in the second dimension does not come at the 
expense of the human dimension of security. See also 
Jannicke Fiskvik, Nordic Security: Moving towards NATO? CSS 
Analyses in Security Policy 189/2016 (Zurich: CSS, 
April 2016), https://ethz.ch/content/dam/ethz/special-
interest/gess/cis/center-for-securities-studies/pdfs/CSSAnalyse-
189-EN.pdf (accessed 19 August 2019). 
86 United States Mission to the OSCE, Response to the OSCE 
Coordinator of Economic and Environmental Activities, 
Differences between participating states, which can 
be fundamental, manifest themselves at the latest 
when the above-mentioned main subject areas, such 
as connectivity or digitalisation, are put in concrete 
terms.87 Russia, for example, is quite open to strength-
ening the second dimension,88 and particularly since 
2016 has tried to give the OSCE a role in exploring 
possible cooperation between the EU and the Russian-
dominated Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU), under 
the heading of “connectivity”.89 Conversely, there is 
the minimal consensus among the EU member states 
that cooperation between the EU and EAEU should 
be limited to individual or purely technical aspects. 
The USA, for its part, strongly rejects the OSCE as a 
mediation forum for the “integration of integrations” 
propagated by Russia. It refers to Moscow or Brussels 
 
PC.DEL/1618/16 (24 November 2016), 
www.osce.org/pc/285286?download=true (accessed 
17 April 2019). 
87 Thematic preferences and specific approaches are 
reflected, among other things, in the national statements in 
the Permanent Council, e.g. in the meetings reserved for sec-
ond dimension matters. This chapter is based on an analysis 
of statements accessible online from the last 10 years. 
88 Moscow, for example, advocates a financial shift towards 
the economic and environmental dimension: savings in the 
third dimension should benefit the first and second dimen-
sions. This attitude, though, is above all an expression of its 
dissatisfaction with third-dimension activities. See, e.g., 
Russia’s Statement on the 2018 Budget, OSCE, Permanent 
Council, Decision No. 1288 (see note 10). Zagorski points out 
that on many economic issues Moscow’s statements, in fact, 
directly address the EU, Andrei Zagorski, “Russia – Contro-
versial Perception”, in Perceptions of the OSCE in Europe and the 
USA, ed. Alexandra Dienes and Reinhard Krumm (Vienna, 
2018), 83–88. 
89 See also Evers, In Retrospect (see note 11), 14–17. 
Between “Win-Win” Assump-
tions and “No Business as 
Usual” 
 Insecurity/Security in the Second Dimension 
 SWP Berlin 
 Cooperation, Trust, Security? 
 December 2019 
 25 
– but not Vienna – as places where such a debate 
may be held. 
Moreover, methodological differences can be 
seen in approaching the tasks of the economic and 
environmental dimension. The USA, for example, 
links its priorities in the second dimension (good 
governance, combating corruption, and combating 
organised crime) with the issue of democracy/democ-
ratisation, and insists on the need to involve civil 
society actors in dealing with the issues they raise. 
This links the priorities to the subject matter of the 
human dimension. The EU also frequently calls for 
“multi-stakeholder” approaches within the second 
dimension and thus for the involvement of civil 
society actors, including media representatives. In 
recent years, however, the participation of non-
governmental organisations in OSCE events, and the 
selection of legitimate or accepted interest groups, 
has developed into an area of conflict within the 
OSCE and between participating states – albeit not 
yet with explicit reference to the economic and 
environmental dimension.90 
Insecurity/Security in the Second 
Dimension 
Participating states differ not only in how they link 
second-dimension issues to human-dimension ones, 
but also to the first dimension and thus to security 
aspects in the narrower sense. To avoid duplicating 
the activities of other international organisations 
with an economic and environmental focus, the EU 
(as its official statements in the Permanent Council 
also advocate) is keen to concentrate on security-
related issues in the second dimension. In doing so, it 
is simply striving for what has already been described 
in various resolutions as the core task of the OSCE in 
the second dimension.91 Yet participating states still 
dispute which topics are relevant for the OSCE from 
this perspective; how explicit the aspect or impact of 
insecurity/security should be; and what the referent 
 
90 Helsinki Commission, In Brief. Non-Governmental Participa-
tion in the OSCE (Washington, D.C., 19 December 2017), 
http://www.csce.gov/sites/helsinkicommission.house.gov/files/
Report%20-%20NGO%20Participation%20-%20Final.pdf 
(accessed 17 April 2019). 
91 See the above section on the development and institu-
tionalisation of the economic and environmental dimension. 
of security should be (i.e. “insecurity/security for 
whom or for what”). 
Even the main areas of work that EU states have 
specified when acting as OSCE chairs in recent years, 
such as digitisation, connectivity or the green econ-
omy, do not necessarily have a security reference – 
or evince even a clearly identifiable threat situation. 
Rather, these issues can be associated with global 
risks, such as corruption, terrorism or climate change. 
The containment of these risks usually requires com-
mon “prevention” or coordinated “management”, 
rather than addressing actual opponents, which is 
simply not possible due to the phenomena’s cross-
border and diffuse nature. Moreover, in contrast to 
dealing with traditional threats, “countermeasures” 
here often do not target an (external) source, but are 
directed inwards as a precaution, at strengthening 
resilience.92 
There is a risk that conflicting 
interests on issues such as smart 
cities and e-governance will not be 
clearly identified. 
In addition to the risks or “challenges”, debates 
in the second dimension often highlight the general 
opportunities offered by new technologies. These 
include e-governance as an opportunity to strengthen 
transparency and fair competition; industrialisation 
4.0 as an opportunity for economic growth; and smart 
cities as an opportunity for sustainable urban devel-
opment.93 Those experts within and representatives 
of delegations to the OSCE who wish to use coopera-
tion in the economic and environmental fields as a 
starting point for further cooperation, in the context 
of the current challenges for European security, wel-
come these topics. At the same time, there is a danger 
that the conflicting interests and sometimes conflict-
ing objectives (e.g. the possibility of using smart city 
technology as a monitoring instrument) also existing 
 
92 This “prevention” potentially also includes control and 
monitoring systems, which could ultimately lead to a restric-
tion of fundamental freedoms, a central issue in the third 
dimension, see Olaf Corry, “Securitisation and ‘Riskification’: 
Second-order Security and the Politics of Climate Change”, 
Millennium: Journal of International Studies 40, no. 2 (2012): 
235–58; see also Jan Pospisil, “Resilienz: Die Neukonfigura-
tion von Sicherheitspolitik im Zeitalter von Risiko”, Österrei-
chische Zeitschrift für Politikwissenschaft 42, no. 1 (2013): 25–42. 
93 They were the subject of various thematic meetings 
under the Italian Chairmanship in 2018. 
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between participating states in these areas will not 
be clearly identified, thus reducing the prospect of a 
productive discussion on these issues.94 
Vague Intentions to Cooperate 
The second-dimension resolutions adopted in recent 
years by the Ministerial Council show that even with 
supposedly less conflict-ridden topics in this OSCE 
field of activity, the willingness to engage in (institu-
tionalised) cooperation is limited. Concrete declara-
tions of intent to enter into intergovernmental coop-
eration, in particular one that would require a certain 
openness on the part of participating states as a basis 
for generating further trust,95 are practically absent 
from the texts. On the contrary, decisions are per-
vaded by a carefully chosen “soft” language that 
avoids, as far as possible, any formulation that could 
be interpreted as an actual obligation. In the opera-
tional part of the texts, participating states are “en-
couraged to promote” the transfer of technology and 
knowledge, the importance of international coop-
eration is “recognised”, the importance of promoting 
regional and sub-regional economic cooperation 
“acknowledged”, and the participating states “invited” 
to implement measures with the aid of intergovern-
mental cooperation, or exchange best practices. Fur-
ther weakening is provided by fillers such as “upon 
the request of participating states” or “where appro-
priate”.96 To bridge the sometimes profound diver-
gences between the positions of the OSCE states – 
but without really compensating for these differences 
– the drafting of resolution texts is sometimes based 
on fragments of already adopted documents from 
other forums or other international organisations. In 
the second dimension, these are above all agreements 
signed within the United Nations, G20, International 
Labour Organisation or World Bank, in addition to 
 
94 Christina Garsten and Kerstin Jacobsson, “Post-Political 
Regulation: Soft Power and Post-Political Visions in Global 
Governance”, Critical Sociology 39, no. 3 (2011): 421–37. 
95 According to Aaron M. Hoffman, for example, the condi-
tion for augmenting trust is that states delegate control over 
their own interests in certain areas, see Hoffman, “A Concep-
tualization of Trust” (see note 67), 377. Keating and Ruzicka 
link trust with the renunciation of hedging strategies, see 
Keating and Ruzicka, “Trusting Relationships” (see note 67). 
96 See the corresponding decisions in the second dimen-
sion, OSCE, OSCE Economic and Environmental Dimension (see 
note 37). 
OSCE decisions from previous years. This sometimes 
restrictive approach is remarkable in so far as all 
decisions taken within the OSCE framework are not, 
in any case, legally but merely politically binding, 
and their implementation is at the sole discretion of 
the individual states themselves. The practice of 
attaching interpretative statements by individual or 
multiple states to the resolutions of the Ministerial 
Councils illustrates how narrow the scope for under-
standing and compromise is.97 The resolution texts 
of other multilateral forums, such as the UN, are fre-
quently also formulaic. Nevertheless, the decisions 
adopted within the OSCE tend to indicate rather a 
lack of trust among the signatories, and to cast doubt 
on their ability to generate this trust. 
 
97 Ibid, 337. 
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Given the general difficulty of building sustainable 
trust through cooperation, and the OSCE’s specific 
starting position, to what extent can it be hoped that 
a reactivation of the second dimension will fulfil 
expectations? Or are sceptics right to worry that a 
stronger commitment to cooperation in “low politics” 
could even be counterproductive to progress on poli-
tical-military and, in particular, human aspects of 
security? 
It is important to note that, from the perspective 
of the chairmanships which have pursued or are pur-
suing a revitalisation of the second dimension, this 
has not been accompanied by a desire to pay less 
attention to the first and third dimensions. The crisis 
in and around Ukraine and related developments are 
among the most important issues for and within the 
OSCE – especially for the countries whose turn it is 
to chair it. The OSCE’s aim is to help stabilise the 
situation, prevent further escalation of violence, and 
defuse the explosive potential of security incidents 
such as the clash between Russia and Ukraine in the 
Sea of Azov in autumn 2018. This is evidenced not 
only by the weekly discussions in the Permanent 
Council, but also by the speeches of foreign ministers 
and heads of delegations at the annual Ministerial 
Council, such as in Milan in December 2018 and 
Bratislava in December 2019. The countries that have 
chaired the OSCE since 2014 and sought to revitalise 
the second dimension did so with the aim of contrib-
uting to overcoming the crisis in European security. 
Here, however, expectation management is the order 
of the day. 
Increased Commitment: The “How” Is 
What Counts 
The general expectation that any kind of cooperation 
within the second dimension has the potential to 
create (sustainable) trust and spillover should be 
abandoned. Does this mean that increased involve-
ment in economic and environmental issues within 
the OSCE is ultimately misguided? Not necessarily – 
but the limited room for manoeuvre can and should 
be better utilised.98 
Sustainable trust, i.e. trust as a social bond, re-
quires shared values and a common identity. It is 
questionable whether such trust can consciously 
be brought about by certain measures. Ultimately, 
however, such bonds are based on communicative 
practice.99 Without raising expectations, the regular 
second-dimension meetings do offer Germany and 
other EU members opportunities to promote their 
values and perspectives, to put forward appropriate 
arguments, and to share their own best practices 
with other participating states. This should be widely 
undertaken. Since meetings in the second dimension 
have so far taken place in a comparatively relaxed 
atmosphere, they should have room for this kind of 
factual argumentation.100 
The decisions of the Ministerial Councils may well 
be the most “tangible” product of the OSCE’s annual 
cycle. However, the text negotiations that precede 
them only take up part of the second half of each 
year. In the second dimension, the three meetings of 
the Economic and Environmental Forum, the imple-
mentation meeting of the economic and environmen-
tal dimension, and numerous other thematic meet-
ings offer a wealth of opportunities for exchange, 
which also but not exclusively feed into the negotia-
 
98 Due to the focus of the present study (see note 21), the 
suggestions refer to the interactions of participating states in 
Vienna. 
99 Berzins, The Puzzle of Trust (see note 69), 129ff; Naomi 
Head, “Transforming Conflict: Trust, Empathy, and Dia-
logue”, International Journal of Peace Studies 17, no. 2 (2012): 
33–55 (35). 
100 See Thomas Gehring on the role of “bargaining” and 
“arguing” in international multilateral negotiations, Gehring, 
“Integrating Integration Theory” (see note 75), 238–41. 
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tion process. On the one hand, there are those who 
claim that the mere fact of regularly meeting in 
Vienna fulfils the postulate of “cooperation” in the 
Organisation’s name. On the other hand, the highly 
ritualised procedures of these meetings, constantly 
reproduced in ready-made national statements which 
are read out during the sessions, supplant open (fac-
tual) discussion; these have already been criticised on 
various occasions, not only with regard to the second 
dimension. Thus far, procedures have only been 
slightly adjusted structurally in response to such 
criticism. Yet this should not prevent Germany from 
making effective use of the meetings during the 
entire annual cycle of the second dimension, together 
with other EU states – both via contributions from 
delegations and by identifying spokespersons who 
contribute their technical expertise. 
In terms of content, these forums should be used 
for political dialogue among the participating states 
on core economic and environmental challenges and 
their impact on European security.101 The aim of this 
exchange would be to provide political impetus – 
as already agreed upon by participating states with 
respect to strengthening the Economic and Environ-
mental Forum in 2004. By focusing on the nexus of 
economy, environment and security (not a new 
demand), second-dimension debates would also tie 
into the discussion on the (crumbling) basic consen-
sus with regard to a rule-based European order and 
common principles. This would also strengthen the 
character of the OSCE as a security organisation in 
the second dimension. Simultaneously, setting topics 
under this premise could counteract the securitisa-
tion of “low politics” topics from the economic and 
environmental sectors. It is thus possible that contro-
versies will be more strongly expressed in the debate 
on economic and environmental issues as well, in 
addition to common ground vis-à-vis the perception 
of challenges and opportunities. However, this should 
not be seen as an obstacle; it is the only way to ex-
change these various views. 
It is fitting and important, both externally and 
internally, for the countries of the European Union 
to speak with one voice within the OSCE and to back 
joint EU statements. This not only has a signalling 
effect: EU coordination also contributes to greater 
 
101 Thus the objective for the then Economic Forum fol-
lowing a 2004 decision (see chapter “Institutionalisation and 
Development of the Economic and Environmental Dimen-
sion”). 
efficiency. This increase in efficiency, however, also 
leaves less room for EU positions in the plenary and 
thus less visibility – time limits for speeches apply 
equally to the EU representative. Close and advance 
coordination between EU colleagues to complement 
joint EU statements with individual speeches in a 
national capacity could therefore help to make EU 
positions more prominent. Furthermore, both the 
joint EU statement and the supplementary national 
comments could be formulated in such a way that 
the thematic meetings lead more emphatically than 
before to concrete discussions – and ideally to a 
productive contest for superior arguments and policy 
approaches. Necessary expertise can be garnered 
through close collaboration between respective 
specialist departments in Brussels, or (in the case of 
Germany) at national level in Berlin, and the delega-
tions in Vienna. 
Although their implementation is often sketchy, 
the texts adopted by the Ministerial Council are the 
most visible result of a chairmanship’s activities. As 
in other multilateral settings, however, in the econo-
mic and environmental dimension the struggle for 
formulations is often more concerned with reassuring 
all those who expressed concerns or reservations. The 
fact that the finished negotiated texts are therefore 
often the expression of the lowest common denomi-
nator and not the product of persuasion based on 
factual arguments does not exclusively apply to the 
OSCE.102 Despite this, Germany, together with other 
EU members, should proactively use the drafting 
process, including to generate spillover. When 
negotiating, they should promote the anchoring of 
references from the first and third dimensions in the 
final documents. Thus far, second-dimension deci-
sions by the Ministerial Council have indeed included 
references to the involvement of other actors, such as 
representatives of non-governmental organisations or 
independent media, and explanations on the impor-
tance of respecting human rights. However, this is not 
a matter of course. On the contrary, various partici-
pating states try to avoid precisely such linkages, and 
 
102 Pouliot, “Hierarchy in Practice” (see note 15), 6. Refer-
encing Jürgen Habermas, Jennifer Mitzen also emphasises 
that convincing with arguments presupposes a genuine 
willingness on the part of the negotiating actors to work 
towards a compromise and adapt their own stances – a con-
dition that is not necessarily given, Jennifer Mitzen, “Read-
ing Habermas in Anarchy: Multilateral Diplomacy and Glo-
bal Public Spheres”, American Political Science Review 99, no. 3 
(August 2005): 401–17. 
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thus ultimately decouple the economic and environ-
mental dimension from the other two. Yet decoupling 
could produce counterproductive results with regard 
to possible spillover: the OSCE’s principles and obliga-
tions could acquire a diffuse character “on paper” as 
well, enabling participating states to choose between 
alternative reference points. Second-dimension deci-
sions, for example, could fall behind those in the 
human dimension in their wording and thus under-
mine the impact of the latter. Overall, this would 
promote a “cherry-picking” strategy in which actors 
commit themselves to formulations of varying reach, 
probably affecting the negotiation of future resolu-
tions as well. In other words, spillover can be both 
positive and negative.103 To avoid negative spillover, 
close and continuous exchange with relevant national 
and EU colleagues from the other dimensions is vital, 
including if possible during the intensive phase of 
negotiations. An EU position agreed beforehand, in-
cluding “red lines”, should make it easier for the EU 
to take an active role in the text negotiations, for 
instance as concerns its demand for references to 
human rights and civil liberties, as well as provide the 
supporting arguments. Such an approach could also 
reduce scepticism about a revival of the second dimen-
sion on the part of those EU member states that fear 
a dilution of OSCE principles as a result. On the one 
hand, that risk of dilution exists. On the other hand, 
it is certainly also the case that skilful negotiation can 
augment texts with statements of liberal principles, 
as happened with the 2018 Declaration on the Digital 
Economy, the final version of which contains, inter 
alia, a commitment to free and open access to the 
Internet. 
Furthermore, representatives from Germany and 
EU states could also advocate cross-dimensional 
decisions from the outset. These would then have to 
be prepared in meetings attended by experts in the 
respective dimensions. As already stated in the 2003 
Maastricht Strategy, most challenges are de facto 
cross-dimensional. This should be reflected in the 
way the OSCE works. In the OSCE’s annual cycle two 
meetings of the committees are meant to be cross-
dimensional in any case. Where applicable, these 
meetings could be used more strategically, including 
with a view to adopting decisions or declarations; and 
 
103 Tana Johnson and Johannes Urpelainen, “A Strategic 
Theory of Regime Integration and Separation”, International 
Organization 66, no. 4 (2012): 645–77 (646); Gehring, “Inte-
grating Integration Theory” (see note 75), 248. 
their significance in the second dimension could be 
increased.104 
Another way of dovetailing the dimensions to 
facilitate positive spillover, or at least prevent second-
dimension progress being made at the expense of the 
other two dimensions, would be to provide package 
solutions. These could bind decisions on the econom-
ic and environmental dimension, which are in the 
interest of states with little regard for progress in the 
third dimension, to progress in the human dimen-
sion. Such an approach, as practised in the early years 
of the CSCE, might not be able to align participating 
states’ differing interests, but could possibly reconcile 
them. 
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